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Decided and Entered: November 10, 2022
Before: Renwick, J.P., Oing, Singh, Kennedy, Mendez, JJ.
Index No. 160031/20 Appeal No. 16632 Case No. 202102853
[*1]In the Matter of 865 First LLC, PetitionerAppellant,
v
New York State Division of Housing and Community Renewal, et al., Respondents
Respondents.

The Law Offices of Jordan M. Hyman, PLLC, Rockville Centre (Jordan M. Hyman of
counsel), for appellant.
Mark Palomino, Office of Legal Affairs, New York (Russell Cirincione of counsel), for
New York State Division of Housing and Community Renewal, respondent.
McLaughlin & Stern, LLP, Garden City (Andrew J. Luskin of counsel), for Tarajia
Morrell, respondent.

Judgment (denominated an order), Supreme Court, New York County (Eileen A.
Rakower, J.), entered on or about June 21, 2021, denying the petition brought pursuant to
CPLR article 78 to annul a determination of respondent New York State Division of Housing
and Community Renewal (DHCR), dated October 1, 2020, which denied landlord's petition

for administrative review (PAR) and affirmed an order of the Rent Administrator, dated June
22, 2020, determining that respondent Tarajia Morrell was entitled to rentstabilized
succession rights to the apartment formerly occupied by her parents, unanimously affirmed,
without costs.
Morrell moved into the apartment in or about September 2016. She lived there with the
tenants of record, her parents, for over three years. During this period, Morrell's parents
commuted between the apartment and a house in Dutchess County. On August 5, 2019,
Morrell's parents wrote to petitioner that they intended to vacate the apartment and for
Morrell to succeed. On August 11, 2019, they sent to petitioner a copy of the form they had
submitted to DHCR regarding Morrell's succession. In response, on August 23, 2019,
petitioner served a notice of lease nonrenewal on Morrell's parents. The parents vacated the
apartment on November 30, 2019. Shortly thereafter, on December 5, 2019, Morrell filed a
complaint with DHCR asserting succession rights. On December 7, 2019, petitioner filed a
holdover petition in Civil Court against Morrell and her parents, asserting that the apartment
was not the primary residence of the tenants of record. On January 13, 2020, petitioner
answered Morrell's complaint only by submitting a copy of its holdover petition.
On June 22, 2020, the DHCR Rent Administrator determined that Morrell had resided
with the tenants of record for two years preceding the date they vacated the apartment and,
therefore, was entitled to a lease in her own name. Petitioner sought administrative review —
arguing, inter alia, that the Covid19 pandemic prevented it from supplementing its original
answer — which was denied. It then commenced the instant article 78 proceeding. Supreme
Court denied the petition and dismissed the proceeding, finding that DHCR's decision was
not arbitrary and capricious.
DHCR's determination of Morrell's succession claim, while a holdover proceeding
raising the same claim was pending before the Housing Court, was not made in violation of
lawful procedure and did not violate petitioner's due process rights. DHCR and the courts
have concurrent jurisdiction to consider succession claims (Matter of RSL 5355 E. 95th LLC
v New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal, 137 AD3d 572, 573 [1st Dept 2016];
Cox v J.D. Realty Assoc., 217 AD2d 179, 181 [1st Dept 1995]), and DHCR properly
exercised jurisdiction over the claim here, as Morrell filed her DHCR complaint before
petitioner commenced its holdover proceeding (see RSL 5355 E. 95th LLC, 137 AD3d at
573). Contrary to petitioner's contention, the holdover [*2]proceeding was not commenced
by petitioner's service of its notice of nonrenewal upon the tenants of record in August 2019,
but rather, by its filing of the holdover petition and notice of petition in Housing Court in

December 2019 (see Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law § 731 [1]; Rent
Stabilization Code [RSC] § 2524.4 [c]). Petitioner cannot argue that its due process rights
were violated by DHCR's determination of the succession claim without first permitting
petitioner to proceed with discovery in the holdover proceeding where petitioner never
sought a stay of the DHCR proceeding. Further, due process requires only that "reasonable
notice be afforded to the parties to a proceeding and that they have an opportunity to present
their objection" (Matter of Greenwich Leasing. LLC v Division ofHous. & Community
Renewal. 91 AD3d 949, 950 [2d Dept 2012] [internal quotation marks omitted]). Here,
petitioner was afforded notice of Morrell's succession claim and an opportunity to object, but
failed to submit any evidence to refute the claim, despite having over six months to do so.
DHCR's denial of the PAR and affirmance of the Rent Administrator's determination
that Morrell was entitled to rent-stabilized succession rights to the subject apartment was
neither arbitrary nor capricious. Morrell demonstrated her succession rights to the apartment
by submitting (among other things) her tax returns, driver's license, and voter records.
Petitioner did not proffer any evidence to refute Morrell's succession claim in response. The
submitted records established that Morrell "resided with the tenant in the housing
accommodation as a primary residence for a period of no less than two years ... immediately
prior to the permanent vacating of the housing accommodation by the tenant" (RSC 2523.5
[b] [1] ; see also§ 2520.6 [u]).
The fact that Morrell's parents maintained a home in Dutchess County was immaterial,
as the evidence established that Morrell resided with them during their time in the apartment.
The statutory text requires only that the succession applicant must reside in the apartment as
a primary residence (see Mexico Leasing. LLC v Jones. 45 Misc 3d 127[A], 2014 NY Slip
Op 51456[U], *2 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2014]). Third Lenox
Terrace Assoc. v Edwards (91 AD3d 532 [1st Dept 2012]) is factually inapposite, because in
that case, the tenant ceased to reside with the succession applicant more than the two years
before permanently vacating the premises. THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND
ORDER
OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.
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